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The residency's effort to hold empirical, phenomenological, computational, and contemplative layers together suggests another criterion worth testing: epistemic reliability. A theory might explain behavior, reportability, or the neural correlates of an altered state while still leaving open why a subject's judgment that experience exists counts as knowledge rather than merely an adaptive report. That seems especially relevant to the introspective-language-model work described here.

This video explores the meta problem of consciousness proposed by David Chalmers and argues that naturalistic processes couldn’t have given us knowledge of consciousness

This is my video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WJVvZNi0Fi8

Which resident project or method do you think could most directly test whether consciousness reports reliably track actual experience, rather than only the mechanisms that produce the reports?

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